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Abstract 
This paper studies the relationship between labor market institutions and policies and labor 
market performance using a new and unique dataset that covers the countries of Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia, which in the last two decades experienced radical economic and 
institutional transformations. We document a clear trend towards liberalization of labor 
markets, especially in the countries of the former Soviet Union, but also substantial 
differences across the countries studied. Our econometric analysis implies that institutions 
matter for labor market outcomes, and that deregulation of labor markets improves their 
performance. The analysis also suggests several significant interactions between different 
institutions, which are in line with the idea of beneficial effects of reform complementarity 
and broad reform packages. Finally, we show that there are important advantages of focusing 
on a broader set of labor market outcomes, and not only on the unemployment rate, which 
until now has been the main approach in the empirical literature.  
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1. Introduction 
Over the last two decades, the labor economics and macroeconomics literature has seen a 
lively debate concerning the role of labor market institutions and policies in explaining labor 
market performance. The initial interest was sparked by the remarkably divergent patterns of 
unemployment within the group of OECD countries (especially between the US and 
continental Europe) observed since the 1970s. In the early 1990s, several theoretical 
contributions, most notably the seminal work by Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991), 
provided essential background for the discussion of the role of institutions and policies in 
shaping aggregate unemployment. At the same time, greater availability of data, in particular, 
as regards measurement of institutions, spurred quantitative empirical research with important 
contributions by Scarpetta (1996), Nickell (1997), Elmeskov, Martin, and Scarpetta (1998), as 
well as by Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), among others. A further impetus for research in this 
field came from policy recommendations by international organizations such as the OECD 
and IMF which, based on their own analyses, advocated systematic institutional deregulation 
of the labor market as a major means of tackling high unemployment (OECD 1994, 1997; 
IMF 2003). 
The early studies, such as Nickell (1997), focused on the role of particular institutions, 
thus assuming that a great deal of labor market dynamics in the OECD countries can be 
attributed to changes in institutions only. This purely institutional approach was challenged by 
a number of scholars who pointed out that changes in institutions between the 1960s and 
1980s were infrequent and rather small and thus could not explain the huge divergence in the 
evolution of labor market aggregates in OECD countries. Consequently, these critics proposed 
an explanation based on the interaction of institutions with economic shocks (Blanchard and 
Wolfers 2000; Bertola, Blau and Kahn 2002). While it still remains an open issue whether the 
model interacting shocks with institutions performs substantially better than the model solely 
employing institutions (see Nickell, Nunziata and Ochel 2005), the attention of labor 
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economists has recently shifted to the idea that institutions may interact with each other in a 
systematic manner (Coe and Snower 1997; Belot and van Ours 2001; Bassanini and Duval 
2009). The main issue in this strand of literature is the complementary nature of labor market 
institutions and policies, which if shown to hold, would provide a rationale for the 
implementation of broad labor market reform packages. In addition, a growing number of 
recent studies have focused on the role of institutional arrangements beyond the labor market, 
such as the degree of competition in the product market and the development of the financial 
market (e.g., Amable, Demmou, and Gatti 2007; Fiori et al. 2007). 
Despite such a large interest in the role of institutions and policies in shaping labor 
market outcomes, the available evidence in the literature remains inconclusive and often 
contradictory. The magnitude and statistical significance of coefficients on institutional 
variables vary a great deal from specification to specification, suggesting the lack of 
robustness (see, e.g., the assessment in OECD 2006). As stressed by Blanchard (2006) who 
summarizes the state of knowledge in the field, there is little doubt that institutions matter, the 
question is which ones and how. While most of the studies suggest that institutional rigidities 
are indeed responsible, at least partially, for the poor performance of labor markets, and thus 
support a deregulatory view of labor market policies (IMF 2003; OECD 2006), several 
authors are critical of this view (Baccaro and Rei 2007; Howell et al. 2007). Also, the 
question of reform complementarities has not received a clear answer either. Several studies 
have reported significant coefficients on interactions of institutional variables (Belot and van 
Ours 2001; Bassanini and Duval 2009), but the results do not appear to be very robust and in 
some cases cannot be easily interpreted.    
The bulk of the available evidence concerning the impact of institutions and policies 
on labor market performance is based on data from two dozen OECD countries. Only in 
recent years have some scholars started to look at the role of labor market institutions and 
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policies in less developed economies (Botero et al., 2004; Feldman 2008). To a considerable 
extent, such interest stems from a much larger variation in institutions and labor market 
policies as well as in labor market outcomes across such an extended list of countries, both in 
the cross-section and time dimension.1 In addition, data from less developed countries in 
principle can help reveal whether the previously obtained conclusions for the OECD 
economies can be generalized to other regions of the world. However, the potential of non-
OECD countries to contribute to the economics literature in general has not yet been fully 
realized because of a general lack of data and/or their low quality. 
Our paper thus serves two purposes. Based on a novel and unique hand-collected 
dataset covering the countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia over the period 1995 to 
2008, it offers a first comprehensive study of the evolution of labor market institutions and 
policies in the transition economies. The paper also revisits the existing evidence concerning 
the role of labor market institutions and policies in shaping labor market outcomes, using the 
newly constructed dataset. In particular, the paper considers the issue of interactions between 
institutional variables, and thus provides new evidence on the complementary nature of labor 
market institutions and policies. We hereby focus on employment protection legislation, union 
density, the tax wedge on labor, the maximum duration of unemployment benefits, the 
average replacement ratio and expenditures on active labor market policies (ALMP) – the 
core set of five labor market institutions and policies identified in the literature (Eichhorst, 
Feil, and Braun 2008). We consider four labor market outcomes, namely the employment-to- 
population ratio, the unemployment, youth unemployment and long-term unemployment 
rates.    
We believe that our paper provides an important contribution to the ongoing policy 
debate concerning the role of institutions and policies in shaping labor market outcomes for at 
                                                 
1 For example, Djankov and Ramalho (2009, p.11) state: “Developing countries present an exciting venue for 
studying the impact of regulatory reforms, including of labor reforms. A number of countries, especially in 
Eastern Europe, have recently undergone significant reforms to make labor regulation more flexible.” 
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least two reasons. First, the use of new, unexplored data has the potential of providing a 
robustness check to the results obtained for developed market economies with OECD data. 
Second, changes in labor market outcomes as well as changes in institutions and policies are 
more marked over time in transition countries than they are in mature OECD countries 
providing thus a natural testing ground of the theoretical considerations that link labor market 
institutions and labor market outcomes. In addition, being the first comprehensive study of its 
type in the transition region, the paper might be of considerable interest to labor economists 
who study transition countries.  
Our data show a fairly modest level of institutional rigidities in the labor market and a 
general trend towards liberalization since the mid-1990s in the whole transition region. 
However, there are important differences across countries. In particular, changes in 
institutions and policies in Central Europe have been rather modest since the mid-1990s, 
except for the declining unionization and decreasing expenditures on active labor market 
policies. In contrast, the countries of the former Soviet Union have considerably liberalized 
their unemployment protection legislation and reduced the tax wedge on labor during the last 
15 years, thus establishing the least stringent regulation of the labor market in the whole 
transition region. The results of our econometric analysis relating institutions and policies to 
labor market outcomes are generally consistent with the view that institutions matter and that 
deregulation of the labor market can improve its performance. There is also evidence that 
institutions interact with each other, which is consistent with the idea of reform 
complementarities and which provides support for broad labor market reform packages. The 
study also suggests important advantages of focusing on a broader set of labor market 
outcomes, and not only the unemployment rate, which until now has been the main approach 
in the empirical literature.  
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The remainder of the paper has the following structure. In section 2 we provide a brief 
overview of the development of labor markets as well as of institutional reforms in transition 
countries and discuss the hitherto scarce literature linking these two. Section 3 presents the 
employed data and in doing so discusses the challenges and pitfalls of data collection in the 
region. The section concludes with a descriptive analysis of the data. Section 4 describes our 
research strategy and the econometric specifications we use, while section 5 discusses the 
econometric results. In section 6 we draw some conclusions. 
 
2. The evolution of labor market institutions and outcomes in the transition countries 
and their reflection in the literature  
Several scholars have already attempted to describe the evolution of labor market institutions 
and policies in the transition countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia as well as to 
analyze links between these institutions and policies and the performance of labor markets 
(e.g., Boeri and Terrel 2002; Cazes 2002; Fialova and Schneider 2009). Besides presenting 
evidence from this large and important region, several such studies were motivated by the 
idea that the transition environment provides the researcher with a unique laboratory for 
hypothesis testing (e.g., Svejnar 1999; Boeri and Lehmann 1999). Indeed, post-communist 
countries started with pretty similar initial conditions in terms of the performance of their 
labor markets. The latter were characterized by shortages of labor, no open unemployment, 
very high levels of unionization, and no unemployment protection.2 Imposing market forces 
on the economies shaped by central planning with simultaneous creation, essentially from 
scratch, of labor market institutions can therefore be regarded as a quasi-natural experiment 
that may be useful in testing economic theories (see, e.g., Muravyev 2008). Moreover, 
research focusing on the region can benefit from the enormous fluctuations of key economic 
                                                 
2 With respect to open unemployment, the former Yugoslavia seems to be the only important exception. For 
example, Saveska (2000) shows that Macedonia (one of the six states that comprised the Yugoslav Federation) 
suffered from double-digit unemployment rates as early as in the late 1970s. 
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variables over time and across space, which helps identify the relationship between the 
variables of interest.  
 We illustrate this point using data on the dynamics of GDP and unemployment in the 
transition region, which are presented in Tables A1 and A2 in appendix I. The data show that 
a few years after the start of market reforms, the experiences of transition countries, including 
labor market outcomes, revealed great differences, often comparable with the differences 
between US and Western European labor markets (Rutkowski 1996).3 One important point 
that the data in Tables A1 and A2 seem to suggest is that the divergent labor market outcomes 
in transition countries cannot be attributed to economic shocks only.4 Institutions and policies, 
whether taken separately or in interactions, should be seriously considered as candidate 
explanations for this divergence.  
 The few existing studies that use data from transition countries have documented a 
number of trends in the evolution of labor market institutions and policies (see, e.g., Svejnar 
2004). At the onset of transition, most countries started developing previously missing 
institutions and policies to ensure an effective functioning of labor markets. At that time, even 
if substantial unemployment rates were foreseen, the governments, especially in Central 
Europe, adopted fairly generous unemployment benefits schemes mainly out of political 
considerations.5 These were subject to cuts, sometimes dramatic, in the 1990s (Riboud, 
Sanchez-Paramo, and Silva-Jauregui, 2002) as the governments struggled to keep budget 
discipline on the background of a considerable and largely unanticipated decline in output 
                                                 
3 While the precision of these estimates may be an issue as the concept of GDP was in general not used in 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia before the early 1990s (the output in the economy was measured as Gross 
Material Product, which excluded services) the general pattern definitely holds.  
4 The data show, for example, that the initial recession lasted only two years in Poland with GDP exceeding the 
pre-transition level already in the mid-1990s while neighboring Ukraine started recovering in 2000 only, after 
having lost almost 60% of its pre-transition GDP level. Interestingly, despite this difference in the magnitude and 
length of the transition shock, the unemployment rate in Poland has persistently remained much higher than in 
Ukraine, 19.0% against 8.6% in 2004, as shown in Table 2. 
5 For example, in Poland the strong political position of “Solidarity” allowed the Mazowiecki government in 
December 1989 to introduce layoffs in labor legislation only in tandem with the introduction of a very generous 
unemployment benefit system that in its first, albeit short-lived, version did grant open-ended benefits to 
anybody even if a person had no previous work experience.    
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(Gomulka 1998). Unionization rates have been in decline throughout the region (Borisov and 
Clarke 2006; Kohl 2008), although the effectiveness of trade unions in promoting the 
economic interests of their members may have increased, especially in Central Europe 
(Rutkowski 1996).6 The countries of the region introduced a number of tax reforms, e.g., the 
switch to the flat personal income tax rate has become a common feature of most countries, 
following the experience of Estonia in 1994. However, the tax burden on labor has remained 
rather high in Central Europe, though not in most of the other transition countries (World 
Bank 2007). While active labor market programs have been introduced throughout the region, 
their share in GDP has been lower than in the old member states of the EU and substantially 
lower in South-Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (World Bank 2005). Importantly, 
despite these general trends, the variation across countries within the same group has 
remained considerable. For example, Estonia and Slovenia are often mentioned among the 
success stories of the economic transition, but they have had perhaps the most dissimilar labor 
market institutions and policies among the CEE countries in the last 20 years.7 
Despite the potential benefits from exploring these large variations in labor market 
outcomes, institutions, and policies in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, relatively little has 
been done so far. The main reason is the unavailability or the low quality of data, especially 
from the early stages of the transformation process. As a result, most of the existing studies in 
the context of transition adopt a partial approach by focusing on particular institutions and 
policies. For example, Nivorozhkin (2005) studies the effect of ALMP in Russia, Commander 
and Heitmueller (2007) discuss the role of unemployment insurance in unemployment 
dynamics of the countries in transition, and Behar (2009) focuses on both tax wedges and 
                                                 
6 Prior to 1989, virtually all trade unions in the Soviet bloc were closely affiliated with and controlled by 
Communist governments and served nearly exclusively as the transmission belt of the policies of the Communist 
parties to the workforce. Defending the economic interests of workers was not part of the brief of these trade 
unions. 
7 In the year 2000, Estonia scored 2.4 on the OECD index of employment protection legislation that ranges from 
0 to 6, spent less than 0.1 percent of its GDP on active labor market policies and the average unemployment 
benefit was only 8 percent of the average wage. The corresponding numbers for Slovenia were 3.3, 0.5 percent 
and 44 percent, respectively. 
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unemployment benefits in the new EU member states. Those papers that attempt to evaluate 
the whole set of the core institutions together (along the lines of Nickell 1997) adopt either a 
purely descriptive approach or supplement data from a few transition countries with data from 
the OECD economies or EU member states (see, e.g., Cazes and Nesporova 2003b, Ederveen 
and Thissen 2007, and Fialova and Schneider 2009). While there are potential benefits of 
combining data from established market economies with those from transition countries, it 
may require more careful econometric modeling and estimation than has been done thus far to 
account for different initial conditions, shocks, and differences in the general institutional 
environment. 
Overall, the evidence concerning the link between institutions, policies, and labor 
market outcomes in transition countries is very limited, hinting at the importance of at least 
some of the labor market institutions in the countries of the region. Looking at specific 
institutions, several studies suggest that employment protection may indeed affect labor 
market outcomes in the transition countries (e.g., Cazes and Nesporova 2003a) as seem active 
labor market policies (Rovelli and Bruno 2007). The study by Fialova and Schneider (2009) 
suggests a role played by the tax wedge, but the sample combines transition and OECD 
countries, while the study by Behar (2009) finds some, albeit weak evidence that tax wedges 
and the duration of unemployment benefits are associated with poor labor market outcomes. 
In contrast, Commander and Heitmueller (2007) find no link between the generosity of the 
unemployment benefits and unemployment rates in transition countries and suggest that the 
overall link between institutions and unemployment rates is weaker in transition countries 
than in Western Europe and other OECD countries.   
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3. Data and general trends of labor market outcomes and institutions  
This paper uses a novel and unique hand-collected database of labor market outcomes, 
institutions and policies in the countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia assembled by us. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the most comprehensive and most up-to-date database of 
this sort collected for the region. It contains information on key macroeconomic variables 
(such as GDP growth and inflation), key labor market statistics (the employment-to-
population ratio, the unemployment rate, the long-term unemployment rate and the youth 
unemployment rate), employment protection legislation statistics, which follow the OECD 
standard (OECD 2004), information about the generosity of the unemployment benefit 
systems (average replacement ratio and maximum duration of unemployment benefits), about 
taxation of labor, namely the tax wedge on labor that measures the cumulative effect of the 
payroll tax paid by employers and income tax paid by employees, expenditures on ALMP as 
well as key data on trade unions.8 Details about the construction of the database are shown in 
Appendix II of the paper.  
The main principle underlying the data collection effort was to achieve maximum 
compatibility of our data with OECD and EU standards. To this purpose, the major sources of 
data for this paper are the OECD and EUROSTAT databases for the countries that during the 
2000s became members of the European Union; World Bank and IMF statistics; as well as 
national statistical sources. Almost all the required data are easily available from the 
mentioned sources for Central European countries that joined the EU in 2004. The quality of 
the data is very high in these cases. As regards countries from South-Eastern Europe and the 
Commonwealth of Independent States, data availability is more limited and the quality of the 
collected data is in some cases of a lower standard. In many instances, we have to rely on 
secondary sources and estimates provided by World Bank or IMF staff in working papers, 
                                                 
8 The list contains the core set of five labor market institutions and policies identified in the literature (Eichhorst, 
Feil, and Braun 2008). 
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policy reports, etc., country reports published by other institutions (e.g., the ILO and national 
research centers) as well as academic working papers and articles (e.g., Eamets and Masso 
2004, Cazes and Nesporova 2006).  
The database covers a 14 years period between 1995 and 2008 and thus excludes the 
very early years of the transition. We opted not to collect data from the first half of the 1990s 
for two reasons. First, the limited availability and low quality of data in the early years of the 
transition, especially in the countries of the former USSR, would leave most of the cells in the 
database empty. For example, Ukraine, the second largest country in the region, did not 
produce unemployment statistics based on the ILO definition until the mid-1990s. Second, the 
early 1990s were still the time of the transition shock, with substantial deviations from 
equilibrium conditions in the economies. Since the theory underlying our empirical analysis 
suggests that labor market institutions affect equilibrium unemployment rates, these 
observations would have been of limited, if any, use in the regression analysis that tries to 
establish the long-run relationship between labor market institutions and policies on the one 
hand and labor market outcomes on the other hand.9  
We had to drop several countries (Belarus, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) 
from the final sample because of severe data problems.10 For example, Belarus does not 
collect statistics measuring ILO unemployment; moreover, the wage setting in the country is 
still heavily influenced by the state via the so-called wage grid not only in the public sector, 
but also in the private sector. Trade unions remain heavily influenced by the state, too. These 
particular institutional arrangements, prevalent in all four countries, simply imply that the 
                                                 
9 Standard remedies suggested in previous studies, such as the use of variables controlling for the output gap, and 
in particular the estimates based on the Hodrick-Prescott filter, may not suffice in the case of a one-time 
permanent shock such as the transition-induced collapse of output. For example, Beck, Kamps, and Mileva 
(2007) argue in the case of Russia that estimates based on the Hodrick-Prescott filter represent very rough 
approximations of the potential output and should be treated with great caution.     
10 These are also the countries that have been regarded as extreme laggards in transition from plan to market by 
the EBRD (see EBRD, various years). 
 12
standard mode of analysis typical of free market economies cannot be directly applied to this 
set of countries.  
Employing our database, we now turn to a discussion of the general trends in the 
evolution of labor market institutions and polices, as well as employment outcomes, in the 
region. This has been done before, but most of the analysis provided in previous studies was 
more fragmentary (in terms of country coverage as well as in terms of time dimension) and 
less supported by hard numbers than we have at our disposal in our study.11 Thus, one of the 
contributions of our paper is to provide a bigger and cleaner picture of the recent trends in the 
region. 
Because of the small variation over time in a number of key variables (employment 
protection legislation is probably the best example), we will provide and discuss the key labor 
market outcome aggregates from four years covering mid- and late transition: 1996, 2000, 
2004, and 2008. The labor market institutions and policies are also presented for four years, 
however with a one year lag, i.e. from 1995 to 2007. For expositional ease, we also classify 
the countries into three major groups, which are typical of the literature studying the region: 
Central Eastern Europe (CEE, embracing the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia), South Eastern Europe (SEE, which includes 
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, and 
Serbia), and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS, which until recently included 12 
out of 15 constituent republics of the former USSR, namely Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russian Federation, Ukraine Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan with Georgia officially leaving the organization in August 
2009). For presentational purposes, most data will be shown in such an aggregated form; 
whenever essential, however, we will also provide and discuss data from particular countries. 
                                                 
11 Such previous analyses include Cazes and Nesporova (2003b), Eamets and Masso (2004), World Bank (2005), 
and Cazes and Nesporova (2006), among others. 
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Finally, for comparison purposes, we will also provide respective statistics for the US and the 
old member states of the European Union (the EU-15). 
Figures 1 and 2 show some striking patterns of labor market outcomes and labor 
market institutions regarding the three groups of transition countries, the EU-15 and the 
United States. The employment-to-population ratio12 is substantially smaller in SEE than in 
the other two transition regions. It is u-shaped for CEE and the CIS, indicating an upturn in 
labor demand in the later part of transition, while in SEE it shows a strong downward trend 
until 2004. Unsurprisingly the highest ratio is found in the U.S., while the EU-15 ratio, 
demonstrating a monotonically increasing ratio is only slightly higher than in CEE and the 
CIS. The unemployment rates also exhibit interesting patterns even if we average the rates 
within regions. It is noteworthy that unemployment rates have been higher in CEE than in the 
CIS for the most part of the period considered even though the employment-to-population 
ratios hardly differ. The other important feature that should be mentioned is the large drop in 
the unemployment rate between 2004 and 2008 in CEE and SEE, whereas the unemployment 
rates drop gently in the CIS, in EU-15 and the U.S.13 Long-term and youth unemployment 
rates are far higher in SEE than in the other two transition regions. The largest drop in both 
rates between 2004 and 2008 can be observed in CEE and SEE.14 
Turning to measures representing labor market institutions we can see the far larger 
changes in these measures for the transition countries, especially in SEE and the CIS, than for 
mature capitalist economies. For example, the EPL index falls substantially in SEE and the 
CIS, in the latter of which the labor market has become even less protection friendly than in 
the EU-15, where we find a very modest decline over the entire period. We see a falling union 
                                                 
12 Since statutory retirement varies across the 5 regions shown in Figure 2, we present the ratios for the 
population aged between 15 and 59.  
13 Part of this large drop in the unemployment rate in CEE and SEE is caused by the migration possibilities 
arising after accession of the NMS. However, since labor demand also rises in these countries between 2003 and 
2007 (Rutkowski 2007), migration cannot explain the entire drop. Disentangling the various factors causing the 
fall in unemployment after accession has not been tackled satisfactorily in the literature (see Lehmann 2010).   
14 Again, part of this large drop is the result of increased migration after accession of the NMS. 
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density rate everywhere, and a particularly pronounced fall in CEE leading to a density rate 
that is roughly half of the EU-15 rate. In the EU-15 and the U.S., density rates move hardly at 
all over the period. Inspection of the chart on the tax wedge leads to several noteworthy 
insights. The tax wedge is far lower in the U.S. than in the other four regions, and the wedge 
fell dramatically after 1999 in the CIS and declined substantially in SEE. In contrast, there is 
only a mild downward trend in CEE, something we do not observe in the EU-15 at all. On this 
measure, labor markets in all transition regions became substantially more flexible than labor 
markets in the EU-15.  
The last three charts deal with active and passive labor market policies and should be 
looked at together. The EU-15 on average spends roughly 1 percent of GDP on ALMP while 
all transition regions spend far less. Especially the CIS spends very little on such policies. The 
U.S., on the other hand has the shortest maximum duration of benefits combined, however, 
with a relatively high replacement rate. The EU-15 combines long maximum duration with 
relatively generous unemployment benefit levels, which might in part explain the relatively 
large long-term unemployment rates. CEE and SEE have maximum durations of roughly one 
year, whereas the CIS exhibits the shortest durations after the U.S. as of 1999. Compared to 
the EU-15 and the U.S., replacement rates are very non-generous in CEE and the CIS, while 
SEE has somewhat higher rates. 
Overall, Figures 1 and 2 show large differences across transition regions and over time 
with regard to labor market outcomes as well as labor market institutions and policies. It is 
this variation that we wish to exploit in our econometric analysis.    
    
4. Our econometric approach 
Our analysis of the links between labor market outcomes on the one hand and labor market 
institutions and policies on the other hand draws heavily on the model proposed in the seminal 
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study by Nickell (1997). In that study, labor market outcome variables are explained by a set 
of variables measuring institutions and policies, as well as by the change in inflation. We 
proceed in an essentially similar fashion by considering, in the baseline specification, six 
variables characterizing institutions and policies as well as two macro controls, the change in 
inflation and the cumulative growth of GDP in the 3 years before labor market outcomes are 
measured.15 We then test the robustness of the results by removing some of the macro 
controls or replacing them with alternative measures (such as output growth relative to the 
pre-transition level of 1989)16 as well as by deleting influential observations from the 
estimation sample.  
The results that we obtain seem to permit a causal interpretation of institutions and 
policies impacting on labor market outcomes (see the discussion in the results section), 
although the reversed causation going from outcomes to institutions and policies is in 
principle conceivable, for example, via the mechanism of elections (Blanchard 2006). We at 
any rate try to avoid a direct manifestation of the endogeneity problem by using lagged (t-1) 
values of the explanatory variables, which can then be regarded as predetermined. So, while 
labor market outcomes are measured in 1996, 2000, 2004, and 2008, data on institutions and 
policies come from the years 1995, 1999, 2003, and 2007.  
 Similar to most other studies, we control for omitted factors (including unobserved 
characteristics of countries) by using random- or fixed-effects specifications of our regression 
                                                 
15 Change in inflation is the key control variable introduced in Nickell (1997) to account for the deviation of the 
unemployment rate from its natural level and is used in most subsequent studies. As there are concerns about the 
appropriateness of this measure in the transition context (Cazes 2002), our baseline specification includes a 
measure of a recent change in GDP, which aims to better account for macroeconomic shocks to which transition 
economies were still prone to even after the initial recession of the late 1980s – early 1990s.   
16 We also have considered several additional control variables, such as proxies for the enforcement of 
institutions, which is likely to be sub-optimal in the countries studied. We have attempted to introduce a separate 
variable measuring enforcement of law based on the data from four waves of the Business Environment and 
Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS), as in Pistor, Raiser, and Gelfer (2000). However, these enforcement 
measures appear to be too noisy and do not alter the baseline results in any substantial way. As the enforcement 
of employment protection legislation may be stricter in richer countries that spend more on the judiciary, we 
have also considered introducing a measure of GDP per capita in the regressions. The results remain 
qualitatively the same as in the baseline specification, however.  
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model. These are necessary as the small number of degrees of freedom does not allow 
inclusion of many potentially relevant explanatory variables. Hence, the baseline regression 
equation can be written in the following way: 
 
1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 6 1
7 1 8 1
it it it it it it it
it it t i it
LMO EPL ALMP TAX DENS BEND BENF
Inflation GDP c
α β β β β β β
β β γ ε
− − − − − −
− −
= + + + + + + +
+ + + + +∆ ∆        (1) 
 
where index i represents country i and index t denotes time, t∈{1996, 2000, 2004, 2008}, 
LMO stands for labor market outcomes (the employment-to-population-ratio - ER, 
unemployment rate - UR, long-term unemployment rate - LTUR, and youth unemployment 
rate - YUR), EPL measures the strictness of employment protection legislation, ALMP is the 
expenditure on active labor policies as a percentage of GDP, TAX is the tax wedge on labor, 
DENS measures union density, BENF stands for the average unemployment benefit 
replacement rate, BEND stands for the maximum duration of unemployment benefits, 
∆Inflation is the change in inflation between time t and t-1, ∆GDP is the cumulative growth of 
GDP in years t-3, t-2, and t-1, γ is a time effect, c is a country effect and ε is a white noise 
disturbance. Like many of the previous studies, we do not apply logarithmic transformation to 
the dependent variables in the model.17 
As can be seen from the specification of equation (1), we only employ one variable 
measuring the role of trade unions, since we only have reliable data on union density. This is 
in contrast to the study by Nickell (1997), which in addition uses union coverage rates as well 
as data on the wage bargaining type of an economy. These two additional variables are 
generally only available for CEE countries. Furthermore, including, e.g., data on the 
bargaining type is not only a problem of measurement, but also of how to interpret these data 
                                                 
17 The regressions with log dependent variables show qualitatively similar results, albeit the fit of the models and 
the statistical significance of the coefficients worsen somewhat.   
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in some less developed transition countries. For example, how would one interpret data on 
bargaining in a country where trade unions with high membership rates are effectively 
controlled by the government? It is therefore no surprise that the World Bank did not provide 
statistics on the coverage rates and bargaining type in the CIS countries (World Bank 2005).18 
At any rate, we believe that we capture the essential aspects of wage setting with our union 
density variable since it is regarded as the most important of the related factors (Eichhorst, 
Feil, and Braun 2008).  
Besides using a number of additional control variables, we sharpen the robustness of 
the results by identifying (using Cook’s D statistics) and excluding the most influential 
observations in the models estimated. In particular, we compare the baseline results with those 
obtained on sub-samples of the original dataset that exclude up to four most influential 
observations, which amount to roughly 5 percent of the total sample of 75 observations at 
hand. This type of correction seems important since the data have been assembled from 
different sources that exhibit potentially different levels of reliability. There are only small 
differences in the results of our baseline regression whether we keep or exclude the outliers. 
However, we present the baseline regression results with the outliers excluded, since the 
exclusion guarantees more accurate estimates of the regression coefficients (see Belsley et al. 
1980).  
As a next step, pairwise interactions of labor market institutions and policies are added 
to the baseline specification. Given the low number of degrees of freedom, only one such 
interaction is inserted at a time. Following Nickell et al. (2005), the interaction terms are 
defined in the form of products of deviations of the institutional variables from their sample 
means. For example, in the case of the interaction between the tax wedge (TAX) and the size 
of the unemployment benefit (BENF), the following specification is estimated: 
                                                 
18 This also suggests that the union density measures in the former Soviet Union need to be taken cum grano 
salis.  
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1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 6 1
7 1 1 8 1 9 1( )( ) ,
it it it it it it it
it it it it t i it
LMO EPL ALMP TAX DENS BEND BENF
TAX TAX BENF BENF Inflation GDP c
α β β β β β β
β β β γ ε
− − − − − −
− − − −
= + + + + + + +
+ − − + + + + +∆ ∆          (2) 
where again t∈{1996, 2000, 2004, 2008} and TAX and BENF  are the sample means (taken 
both over time and across countries) of variables TAX and BENF, respectively. In our 
complex case, where we have more than one labor market outcome, the sign of β7 implying 
complementarity depends on which outcome we analyze and whether we have an 
institution/policy whose strengthening has a deleterious or beneficial effect in the labor 
market. When LMO is an element of the set {UR, LTUR, YUR} and when the two explanatory 
variables presumably have a deleterious effect on the performance of the labor market (for 
example, an increase in the variables TAX and BENF are supposed to increase 
unemployment), then a negative and statistically significant coefficient β7 implies 
complementarity. In the case of labor market outcome ER, a positive and statistically 
significant coefficient β7 implies reform complementarity. It might be useful to show these 
points with our specific example of equation (2). 
  Let LMOit be URit. Then, if we take the partial derivative with respect to Taxit-1 in 
equation (2), we get: 
3 7 1
1
( )it it
it
UR Benf BenfTax β β −−
∂ = + −∂ . 
The direct partial (β3) should be positive, i.e. lowering Tax should lower UR. Lowering 
benefits should also lower unemployment. So, if Benfit-1 is below the sample mean taken over 
all countries and time, benefits are relatively employment friendly in country i. This means 
that the expression in the parenthesis is negative, so a relatively employment friendly benefit 
level will complement a lowering of the tax wedge, i.e. will augment the direct positive 
partial, only if ß7 is negative. The same reasoning holds for LTUR and YUR. 
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Now let LMOit be ERit. Taking the partial derivative with respect to Taxit-1 gives the same 
result, but the interpretation is now different: 
3 7 1( ).it it
it
ER Benf BenfTax β β −∂ = + −∂  
The direct partial is now negative, i.e. lowering Tax should increase ER. Again, an 
employment friendly benefit level implies that the expression in brackets is negative. Hence, 
for benefits to have a complementary effect when the tax wedge is lowered the coefficient ß7 
has to be positive.  
 This kind of reasoning can only be invoked if a more “rigid” (or generous) 
manifestation of both institutions supposedly has a deleterious effect on labor market 
performance. For example when we include ALMP as the primary variable the reasoning has 
to be altered since an increase in the expenditures on ALMP supposedly improves the 
performance of the labor market, i.e. it increases ER and decreases UR. So, when LMO = ER  
a negative ß7 implies complementarity, while a positive ß7 holds when LMO is an element of 
the set {UR, LTUR, YUR}. 
 Following Bassanini and Duval (2009) we also apply instrumental variables to the 
interaction term in order to check for potential spurious correlations between two institutions 
that might be uncorrelated but where one of the two is a “stand in” for an omitted institution. 
We instrument each interaction between two institutions, say TAX and BENF, with the 
product of the deviations of TAX and BENF from their respective country-specific means.19 
In a last step, we also consider interactions of institutions with the overall institutional 
environment, by using the specification suggested by Bassanini and Duval (2009):  
 
                                                 
19 A formal proof of the validity of such instruments is given in the appendix of Bassanini and Duval (2009). 
From this proof we, of course, cannot conclude that in all cases these instruments are valid.  
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where βj denotes the direct effect of institution Instj at the sample average or, in other words, 
for a country with an average institutional environment, whereas γk  indicates the strength of 
interaction between Instk and the overall institutional environment, the latter of which is 
captured by the third summation term in (3). In particular, for LMO ∈ {UR, LTUR, YUR}, 
higher values of variables measuring institutions that tend to increase unemployment (such as 
the tax wedge) would drive this term up (as βj  – the direct effect – is positive for these 
institutions) while higher values of employment-friendly institutions (such as ALMP) would 
imply a decrease in this term (as βj  is negative). When LMO=ER, the opposite occurs.  We 
thus have an interpretations of the γk’s in equation (3) that is equivalent to the interpretation of 
β7, depending on the labor market outcome analyzed and on whether higher values of an 
institution have a deleterious or beneficial effect on labor market performance. Again, 
t∈{1996, 2000, 2004, 2008}. We estimate model (3) using non-linear least squares.   
Definitions and descriptive statistics of the variables that we use in our regressions are 
given in Table 1. This table confirms the tremendous variation in the labor market outcomes, 
institution and policy variables and shows the large differences in the main macro variables 
such as inflation and GDP growth in our sample of transition countries.  
The control variables are correlated with some of the labor market institution measures 
as Table A3 demonstrates. We also see that employment protection legislation is negatively 
correlated with the employment-to-population ratio but positively correlated with the other 
three outcome variables. Union density is negatively correlated with the employment ratio, 
and has a positive raw correlation with the long-term and youth unemployment rates. Neither 
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the tax wedge nor benefit duration show significant raw correlations with labor market 
outcomes, while the replacement rate and ALMP are weakly correlated with long-term and 
youth unemployment rates, respectively.  
 
5. Results 
The random effects and fixed effects estimates of the baseline specification (equation 1) are 
reported in Table 2. The two estimators give very similar results and since the Hausman test 
does not reject the consistency of the random effects estimator in the sample being analyzed, 
we find it sensible to focus on the random effects estimates because of their greater efficiency 
and because a random effects estimator might be considered best in capturing omitted time-
invariant institutions. As discussed above, we have undertaken some robustness checks by 
estimating equation 1 with and without outliers and by also experimenting with different 
macro controls. The results of the different specifications diverge little and we prefer to 
present the results with outliers removed – the results with the second set of macro controls 
are also shown in table A4 in the appendix.20 As can be seen from Table 2, labor market 
outcomes are strongly affected by some of the institutions and policies even with year 
dummies included.  
 An increase in the employment protection legislation index strongly depresses the 
employment rate and boosts the youth unemployment rate, a result that might be considered in 
line with the “classical” explanation that job creation is hindered by too strict employment 
protection leaving some of the new labor market entrants in the state of unemployment. It is, 
also noteworthy that the main countervailing effect of employment protection put forth in the 
literature, namely reducing outflows from employment into unemployment (see, e.g., Bertola 
1990), can also be inferred from the result that overall unemployment is unaffected. So, a high 
                                                 
20 The results of the baseline specification that include outliers are presented in Lehmann and Muravyev (2009). 
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level of employment protection in transition countries might on average prevent workers’ job 
loss even in the face of enforcement problems while at the same time it might make firms 
hesitant to create new jobs. Expenditures on ALMP do not affect the employment rate 
confirming our prior, but they strongly impact on the three unemployment rates.  For 
example, an increase of ALMP expenditures of one tenth of a percentage point will lower the 
overall unemployment rate by slightly less than half a percentage point, the long-term 
unemployment rate by about one third of and the youth unemployment rate by a bit more than 
one percentage point. Our results also show that a one point rise in the tax wedge will lower 
the employment rate by roughly a third of a percentage point, but will not influence any of the 
unemployment rates. Finally, with the second set of macro controls we also find that a rise in 
benefit duration raises the long-term unemployment rate (see table A4).  
  Clearly, all these significant results are convincing insofar as they are in line with 
predictions from the theoretical literature. The results connected to ALMP also strike us as 
strong evidence that we actually look at causal effects. In many studies one finds a positive 
coefficient on ALMP expenditures when the unemployment rate is the regressand, pointing to 
an endogeneity problem: governments might react to higher unemployment rates by raising 
expenditures on ALMP, leading to a positive correlation between the two variables. In 
transition countries such a reaction by the government is not very likely given the particularly 
severe budget constraints and the very low levels of ALMP expenditures. More importantly, 
the coefficients on ALMP expenditures are negative in Table 2 for all three measures of 
unemployment thus pointing to a causal effect that runs from ALMP expenditures to 
unemployment. So, it is not only the fact that we use lagged explanatory variables but the 
results themselves that strengthen our conviction that we are capturing causal effects in Table 
2.21  
                                                 
21 Since we only have four data points over four year intervals, a Granger Causality Test strikes us as not 
implementable. It also seems not very meaningful given the lag/lead structure of our data, since a rigorous 
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Our results might also be interpreted with one other important facet of labor markets 
in transition economies in mind, namely informal employment. If we are to believe the 
estimates of Schneider et al. (2010) informality is very wide-spread in transition countries. 
Some labor market institutions and policies might have an impact on the size of informal 
employment. Perhaps the most interesting result in this regard is that EPL negatively affects 
the employment-to-population ratio, but does not appear to affect unemployment, except for 
youth unemployment. If EPL indeed reduces the employment-to-population ratio, where the 
ratio captures predominantly formal employment, but this reduction is only accompanied by 
an increase in youth unemployment, this first of all has the straightforward interpretation that 
EPL ceteris paribus depresses labor demand via the channel of reduced hiring of young 
workers. But having no impact on the overall unemployment rate it might additionally imply 
that strong employment protection pushes workers into unprotected informal employment 
relationships or directly into the informal sector of the economy. By the same token, our 
results show that higher tax wedges on labor depress the employment-to-population ratio, but 
there is no corresponding effect on the unemployment rates. So, this seems to suggest that 
higher taxes on labor further the incidence of informal work in transition countries.  
In OECD (2008), higher values of the two mentioned institutions, EPL and taxes on 
labor, are indeed found to boost informal employment in the Visegrad countries and in 
Slovenia. While there is strong and unequivocal evidence that taxes on labor have a 
deleterious effect on formal employment, the evidence on the impact of EPL is more mixed 
since only where enforcement mechanisms are weak enhanced employment protection makes 
firms hire workers on an informal basis. So, even though we do not have a measure of 
informal employment in our data set, but an imprecise measure of its complement, our results 
                                                                                                                                                        
interpretation of the Granger Causality Test prompts one only to conclude that one variable leads another 
variable but not that one variable is truly caused by this other variable.   
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produced for the largest set of transition countries to date seem to suggest that more rigid 
labor market institutions and higher costs on labor encourage informal employment. 22  
 We now turn to the regression analysis that deals with the interactions of institutions. 
As already mentioned, we introduce one interaction at a time in the regression model which is 
then estimated using the random-effects estimator. As we have 6 institutional variables, there 
are 15 possible interactions. Table 3 shows the results of estimating model (2) for the four 
dependent variables and 15 pair-wise interactions. Note that the table reports only the 
estimated coefficients on the interactions as well as the associated standard errors, and each 
estimate comes from a separate regression.23 The first interesting result in Table 3 concerns 
interactions of ALMP with other institutions. As elaborated above, in the case of ER a 
negative and significant coefficient on the interaction of ALMP with another variable, which 
negatively affects labor market performance, implies complementarity while the coefficient is 
positive when we deal with UR, LTUR or YUR.  We find positive and significant coefficients 
on the interaction of ALMP with the tax wedge (for unemployment and long-term 
unemployment), positive and significant coefficients on the interaction of ALMP with union 
density (in all regressions except for the one with employment to population ratio), as well as 
a positive and significant coefficient on the interaction of ALMP with EPL in the regression 
with long-term unemployment rate as the dependent variable. Overall, these results may be 
interpreted as suggesting that active labor market programs are more effective in tackling the 
three types of unemployment in an economy with lower taxes, lower unionization, or lower 
employment protection.  
The only other interesting result transpiring from Table 3 concerns the interaction of 
the tax wedge and benefit duration. This interaction enters the regressions with long-term 
unemployment and youth unemployment with negative and statistically significant 
                                                 
22 Even if there is measurement error in ER, as long as this error is not correlated with εit, our results are 
consistent even though they are not efficient. 
23 These separate regressions are not shown here but available upon request. 
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coefficients, thus suggesting complementarity between policies aimed at reducing the tax 
wedge and policies aimed at restricting the duration of unemployment benefits. The effect of 
one measure will be stronger if accompanied by the other. The point estimates also imply that 
reducing the costs of labor benefits more young job seekers than the long-term unemployed 
when benefit duration is simultaneously shortened.  
The results related to ALMP do not survive if we instrument the interactions. This, 
however, does not necessarily imply that all the OLS estimates are spurious since the used 
instruments turn out to be very weak in the case of four interactions (Table A5). Only when 
ALMP is interacted with EPL do we have strong instruments but insignificant coefficients on 
the interactions. It is noteworthy, though, that with strong instruments we have significant and 
similar point estimates for the interaction of the tax wedge and benefit duration when LTUR 
and YUR are the regressands. We also find a significant complementarity of reducing union 
density and benefit duration for the long-term and young unemployed. As long as unions 
discriminate against outsiders (the long-term unemployed and the young) shortening the 
duration of benefits in a less unionized economy might boost outflows out of unemployment 
for these outsiders. 
Most noteworthy is, however, the fact that the interaction of the tax wedge and benefit 
duration significantly affects long-term and youth unemployment whether we use OLS or IV 
estimation. We should also stress that for overall unemployment we have a negative 
coefficient that is close to significance in both OLS and IV regressions. So, in transition 
countries lowering the cost of labor will result in hires out of unemployment, and in particular 
out of long-term and youth unemployment, if the cost of searching is increased for the 
unemployed.  
Finally, results of the regression analysis that focuses on systemic interactions across 
institutions are shown in Table 5. For each LMO there are six coefficients characterizing the 
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direct effect of each institution (ßj) in as well as six coefficients (γk) characterizing the strength 
of interaction between each institution and the overall institutional environment. We should 
interpret the results presented in Table 5 taking into account the substantial increase in the 
number of regressors in this specification which, given the small number of observations, 
inevitably implies less precise regression estimates. We therefore discuss not only those 
coefficients that turn out to be statistically significant at the conventional significance levels, 
but also the coefficients with t-statistics exceeding unity, since this typically allows to make 
inferences about the sign of the relationship between the variables of interest).  
The estimated direct effects of each institution are in line with those reported in Table 
2 for the baseline specification. In particular, EPL appears to have a negative effect on ER and 
positive effect on YUR across the two set of estimates, albeit in the “systemic interactions” 
model with ER as the dependent variable the coefficient falls short of achieving statistical 
significance. Similarly, both in the baseline specification and in the “systemic interactions” 
model the coefficients on the variable TAX are negative, close to each other in magnitude and 
statistically significant, implying that higher taxes decrease the employment-to-population 
ratio.  
With respect to the interactions of individual institutions with the overall institutional 
environment, the picture is somewhat less clear. Although seven of twenty-four coefficients 
have t-statistics greater than unity, neither achieves statistical significance at the conventional 
levels. If one resorts to the sign interpretation of the coefficients with t-statistics greater than 
unity, five of seven of them have the expected sign.24 For example, the sign of coefficient γ on 
variable BEND in the equations with ER, UR and YUR as the dependent variables would 
suggest that lowering benefit duration would lead to a more pronounced decrease in the two 
unemployment types and a stronger increase in employment if other institutions are more 
                                                 
24 The two coefficients that are wrongly signed are those on variables ALMP and TAX in the ER equation. 
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employment-friendly. Similarly, an increase in ALMP would have a stronger effect on 
reducing unemployment in a more employment-friendly institutional environment. Overall, 
these results provide some evidence in favor of the hypothesis on institutional 
complementarities.        
We would like to stress that our analysis is only a first attempt at linking labor market 
outcomes and institutions in transition countries since there are at least three caveats that one 
might want to address in future research. First, there is a potential for refining the estimates as 
soon as more data from the transition region become available.25 The second caveat relates to 
international migration as a means of mitigating the tension in the labor market. Nickell 
(1997) proceeded under the assumption that “[d]ifferent European countries are effectively 
different labor markets with the intercountry movement of labor being very small, mainly 
because of language and cultural barriers.” This may have been true in the 1980s in the EU-
15, but the recent experience of large temporary migration of workers from the new member 
states to the UK and Ireland has to be interpreted as evidence that migration matters for labor 
market outcomes in host as well as sender countries. Also, until the crisis 2008, international 
undocumented migration was a wide spread phenomenon within the transition region itself, 
with Russia taking the brunt of this migration and having millions of foreign migrants from 
Central Asia and Caucasus, but also from Moldova, Belarus and Ukraine working 
predominantly without permits. The third caveat relates to the varying degree of informal 
employment across transition countries. The informal economy was not insignificant even 
before the collapse of the iron curtain, but definitely took off in the less developed countries 
of the region in the 1990s. A dramatic decline in employment-to-population ratios observed in 
some countries of South-Eastern Europe and of Central Asia might point to a rise in informal 
employment. Also, Lehmann (2009) moots for, e.g., Macedonia that a large part of the long-
                                                 
25 For example, OECD has recently expanded its EPL database by adding retrospective data for a number of 
transition countries.   
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term unemployed are workers who are sporadically employed in the informal economy. Thus 
informal employment may distort the observed labor market outcomes in the less developed 
transition countries to some degree. At any rate, these three caveats do not invalidate our 
results but they point to future potential refinements of our research.     
 
Conclusions 
In our analysis we use a unique data set that covers labor market outcomes, labor market 
institutions and macroeconomic controls from early to late transition, i.e., from 1995 to 2008, 
for the majority of transition countries, including countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE), South-Eastern Europe (SEE) and most of the successor states of the Soviet Union. Our 
data set is unique in that we bring together compatible data on the above mentioned items 
from these three regions. We investigate the importance of labor market institutions for labor 
market outcomes in transition countries. Given the large shocks and their tremendous 
variation across countries and time and given the fact that changes in labor market institutions 
over a relatively short span are more pronounced than in mature capitalist economies the 
pursuit of this research question strikes us as particularly fruitful with the help of the collected 
data.  
 The descriptive analysis shows that there are large differences regarding labor market 
outcomes across the three regions and over time. The general picture regarding the evolution 
of labor market institutions points to a liberalization of labor markets in the region that is 
more pronounced than in the old EU member states. 
The econometric evidence that we present shows the importance of labor market 
institutions in the determination of labor market outcomes and is in line with the idea that the 
deregulation of labor markets improves their performance. In our baseline estimations we use 
the random effects estimator and lag the institutions and policies by one period. Because of 
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this estimation strategy and because labor market institutions evolve slowly over time we 
think of these correlations as pointing to causal effects that run from institutions to labor 
market outcomes. Importantly, we find that not all of the institutions and policies matter and 
when they do, then not to the same extent. In particular, we find a robust negative effect of 
stricter employment protection on employment and a significant positive impact on youth 
unemployment, while active labor market policies do not affect employment but strongly all 
three types of unemployment, in particular youth unemployment. The tax wedge is found to 
have a strong impact on the employment-to-population ratio, but not on any of the 
unemployment types, a result that might point at a scenario where high labor costs push 
workers into informal employment. The other institutions do not seem to determine labor 
market outcomes in a significant way. The results from these base line regressions alone show 
that we can gain when we analyze more than just the labor market outcome overall 
unemployment (UR). 
When we look at single interactions of one policy or one institution with one other 
institution we can establish two interesting results. First, active labor market policies, which 
never impact on employment, are more effective in tackling the three types of unemployment 
in an economy where taxes on labor are lower, there is less unionization and lower 
employment protection. The second result, which is particularly robust, points to a 
complementary interaction of the tax wedge and the duration of unemployment benefits. 
Lowering taxes on labor will decrease long-term and youth unemployment more when benefit 
duration is shortened. This implies a clear interaction of labor demand and labor supply as 
firms will hire more workers whose search costs have increased and thus whose reservation 
wages have fallen.  
Our analysis of the interactions of individual institutions with the overall institutional 
environment is somewhat plagued by the low degrees of freedom. We, therefore, highlight 
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results with a t-statistic greater than 1 as we thus can establish the sign of the interaction. Two 
results are particularly noteworthy. Shortening benefit duration will raise employment in a 
more pronounced way and will have a larger negative impact on unemployment and youth 
unemployment if the overall environment is more employment-friendly. Furthermore, under 
such circumstances, an increase in expenditures on ALMP will more dramatically lower the 
unemployment rate. These results in tandem with those about individual interactions 
demonstrate that reforming two institutions jointly or applying broad reform packages will 
generate larger benefits than focusing on the reform of one single labor market institution.   
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Figure 1. Labor market outcomes by region. 
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Figure 2. Labor market institutions by region. 
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Source: For transition countries: Data Base of IZA Program Area “Labor markets in emerging and transition 
economies”, OECD and Eurostat for other countries.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics and definitions of variables, final estimation sample. 
Variable Short description Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ER Employment-to-population ratio, % 75 61.92 9.97 33.60 77.60 
UR Unemployment rate (ILO), % 75 12.13 7.15 3.90 37.20 
LTUR Long-term unemployment rate (ILO), % 71 7.62 6.88 0.57 31.77 
YUR Youth unemployment rate (percent 
unemployed among 15-24 years old) 
74 27.33 15.19 7.20 69.50 
EPL Employment protection legislation, overall 
index (OECD) 
75 2.46 0.55 1.52 4.10 
DENS Union density, % 75 40.54 19.51 13.18 94.00 
TAX Tax wedge on labor, % 75 39.63 4.75 23.00 48.27 
ALMP Expenditures on active labor market 
policies, % GDP 
75 0.20 0.18 0.01 0.83 
BENF Unempl. benefit replacement ratio (average 
benefit to average wage) 
75 26.11 10.81 7.00 60.00 
BEND Maximum duration of unemployment 
benefit, months 
75 11.97 5.21 6.00 24.00 
∆Inflation Change in inflation rate, % 75 -6.77 26.01 -110.60 58.07 
GDPt-1/GDP1989 GDP level in relation to GDP in 1989 75 0.91 0.31 0.34 1.77 
∆GDP_3Y Cumulative GDP growth in the three 
preceding years 
75 1.15 0.18 0.76 2.00 
Source: Data Base of IZA Program Area “Labor markets in emerging and transition economies.” 
 
Table 2. Labor market performance, institutions and policies: baseline regression results with outliers eliminated. 
 Employment rate Unemployment rate Long-term unemployment rate Youth unemployment rate 
 RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE 
EPL -4.345*** -4.258** 0.255 0.079 0.223 0.078 5.677*** 5.206*** 
 (1.449) (1.505) (0.705) (0.779) (0.552) (0.636) (1.537) (1.496) 
ALMP 2.798 2.736 -4.633** -4.342* -3.182** -2.762 -11.481*** -11.736*** 
 (2.753) (3.100) (1.928) (2.327) (1.597) (1.851) (3.194) (3.167) 
TAX -0.308** -0.336** -0.064 -0.061 -0.048 -0.032 -0.452 -0.372 
 (0.144) (0.148) (0.132) (0.129) (0.096) (0.094) (0.290) (0.317) 
DENS -0.031 -0.007 0.030 0.033 0.006 0.007 0.037 0.031 
 (0.039) (0.048) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.046) (0.051) 
BEND -0.141 -0.139 0.020 0.016 0.043 0.045 0.040 -0.051 
 (0.186) (0.193) (0.103) (0.121) (0.070) (0.072) (0.191) (0.227) 
BENF 0.009 0.014 0.026 -0.012 0.011 -0.028 -0.013 -0.076 
 (0.099) (0.112) (0.075) (0.090) (0.050) (0.055) (0.160) (0.181) 
∆Inflation -0.015 -0.020 0.005 0.007 0.008 0.010 -0.034 -0.031 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.034) (0.032) 
∆GDP_3Y -2.983 -2.543 -8.475*** -8.198** -8.094*** -8.399*** -16.471*** -15.888*** 
 (2.609) (3.045) (2.788) (3.182) (2.112) (2.251) (5.067) (5.424) 
Y2000 -2.122 -1.642 2.643** 2.579* 2.014* 1.956* 7.447*** 6.916** 
 (1.784) (1.730) (1.331) (1.305) (1.068) (1.028) (2.615) (2.567) 
Y2004 -4.004* -3.314 2.155 1.931 2.292 2.108 6.376** 5.693* 
 (2.066) (2.115) (1.731) (1.647) (1.405) (1.289) (2.838) (2.783) 
Y2008 -3.477 -2.792 -0.719 -0.898 -0.122 -0.275 -0.904 -1.437 
 (2.414) (2.332) (1.794) (1.665) (1.584) (1.444) (2.955) (2.819) 
Intercept 92.457*** 91.701*** 21.166*** 22.225*** 16.563*** 17.617*** 47.262*** 47.594*** 
 (6.852) (8.100) (7.298) (7.200) (5.250) (5.448) (15.965) (15.898) 
r2 0.36 .36 0.59 .59 0.60 .60 0.66 .66 
N 74 74 73 73 69 69 73 73 
Spec. tests:         
Breusch-Pagan  67.74 (0.000)  72.51 (0.000)  72.48 (0.000)  50.25 (0.000)  
Hausman  1.14 (0.999)  1.56 (0.999)  2.59 (0.995)  2.58 (0.995)  
Notes: The results are obtained using the random- (RE) or fixed-effects (FE) estimators with cluster-robust standard errors (clustering by country). Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. Asterisks denote significance levels: *** - significant at 1%, ** - significant at 5% and * - significant at 10%. R2 refers to the within variation in the 
data. Breusch and Pagan test for random effects as well as Hausman test are reported at the foot of the table. The first number in these tests is the Chi2 statistics, the second 
number is the probability level.  
 
Table 3. Pairwise interactions between different institutions and policies.  
  ER UR LTUR YUR 
ALMP_TAX -1.109 1.602** 1.647** 1.424 
  (0.806) (0.746) (0.725) (1.090) 
ALMP_DENS -0.135 0.399** 0.332** 0.609** 
  (0.186) (0.179) (0.156) (0.271) 
ALMP_BENF -0.145 -0.119 -0.021 0.067 
  (0.331) (0.276) (0.210) (0.535) 
ALMP_BEND -0.563 -0.036 0.037 -0.204 
  (0.417) (0.417) (0.374) (0.665) 
ALMP_EPL 1.526 5.344 5.556* 6.409 
  (4.546) (3.254) (3.065) (4.880) 
EPL_TAX 0.094 0.329 0.299 0.375 
  (0.224) (0.200) (0.192) (0.352) 
EPL_DENS 0.018 0.004 0.002 -0.052 
  (0.060) (0.045) (0.032) (0.094) 
EPL_BENF -0.106 -0.003 -0.005 0.102 
  (0.071) (0.090) (0.085) (0.177) 
EPL_BEND 0.042 -0.121 -0.098 -0.383 
  (0.122) (0.147) (0.148) (0.351) 
TAX_DENS 0.000 0.004 0.008 -0.008 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) 
TAX_BENF 0.019 -0.016 -0.007 -0.022 
  (0.016) (0.014) (0.012) (0.027) 
TAX_BEND -0.003 -0.040 -0.045* -0.121*** 
  (0.036) (0.026) (0.024) (0.037) 
DENS_BENF -0.003 -0.001 0.002 0.003 
  (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) 
DENS_BEND -0.007 -0.003 -0.002 -0.011 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.013) 
BENF_BEND -0.011 -0.000 -0.000 0.019 
 (0.013) (0.009) (0.007) (0.015) 
Notes: Each coefficient in the table is taken from a separate regression (the baseline specification augmented 
with a single interaction). The results are obtained using the random-effects estimators with cluster-robust 
standard errors (clustering by country). Standard errors for the coefficient on the interaction terms are reported in 
parentheses. Asterisks denote significance levels: *** - significant at 1%, ** - significant at 5% and * - 
significant at 10%. 
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Table 4. Pairwise interactions between different institutions and policies: IV regressions. 
  ER UR LTUR YUR 
ALMP_TAX -7.288 -1.330 -5.068 3.124 
  (8.551) (4.226) (6.594) (8.333) 
ALMP_DENS -0.321 0.371 0.208 0.261 
  (0.527) (0.357) (0.289) (0.706) 
ALMP_BENF -0.528 -0.907 -0.276 -0.931 
  (2.179) (1.745) (1.530) (3.199) 
ALMP_BEND -3.262 4.495 2.416 8.293 
  (4.442) (4.534) (3.038) (9.658) 
EPL_ALMP 138.042 -109.376 18.663 -101.27 
  (202.926) (389.907) (41.185) (126.051) 
EPL_TAX 1.746 -0.088 0.731 -3.633 
  (1.308) (0.976) (0.746) (2.637) 
EPL_DENS 0.029 0.031 0.033 0.192 
  (0.137) (0.098) (0.061) (0.200) 
EPL_BENF -0.023 -0.051 -0.128 0.009 
  (0.205) (0.153) (0.135) (0.293) 
EPL_BEND -0.382 -0.381 -0.37 -0.952 
  (0.432) (0.333) (0.258) (0.638) 
TAX_DENS 0.102 -0.012 -0.001 -0.161 
  (0.135) (0.054) (0.132) (0.123) 
TAX_BENF 0.032 -0.006 0.004 -0.007 
  (0.023) (0.017) (0.017) (0.037) 
TAX_BEND -0.028 -0.062 -0.059** -0.143** 
  (0.054) (0.039) (0.030) (0.064) 
DENS_BENF 0.003 -0.017 -0.005 -0.019 
  (0.012) (0.011) (0.007) (0.017) 
DENS_BEND 0.005 -0.016 -0.015* -0.045** 
  (0.013) (0.010) (0.009) (0.022) 
BENF_BEND -0.062 -0.059 -0.007 -0.11 
 (0.181) (0.086) (0.037) (0.204) 
Notes: Each coefficient in the table is taken from a separate regression (the baseline specification augmented 
with a single interaction). The results are obtained using the random-effects estimators with cluster-robust 
standard errors (clustering by country). Standard errors for the coefficient on the interaction terms are reported in 
parentheses. Asterisks denote significance levels: *** - significant at 1%, ** - significant at 5% and * - 
significant at 10%. 
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Table 5. Systemic interactions across institutions, non-linear OLS estimates. 
 ER UR LTUR YUR 
β: Direct effect of institutions: 
EPL -2.028 0.205 0.240 3.448* 
  (1.624) (0.550) (0.437) (1.743) 
ALMP 0.189 -0.589 -0.155 -2.820 
  (2.766) (1.592) (0.425) (3.228) 
TAX -0.382* 0.132 0.102 0.018 
  (0.192) (0.134) (0.141) (0.166) 
DENS -0.147 0.042 0.003 -0.042 
  (0.097) (0.034) (0.015) (0.042) 
BEND      -0.254 -0.047 -0.042 -0.091 
  (0.206) (0.100) (0.092) (0.137) 
BENF 0.013 0.017 0.019 -0.070 
  (0.107) (0.053) (0.040) (0.094) 
γ: Interactions between institutions and the sum of direct effects: 
EPL -0.012 0.638 0.822 0.591 
  (0.507) (1.233) (2.287) (0.730) 
ALMP 1.237 8.789 16.950 3.259 
  (1.207) (8.707) (24.339) (4.054) 
TAX -0.027 -0.022 -0.003 0.115 
  (0.022) (0.095) (0.119) (0.159) 
DENS -0.012 0.009 0.008 -0.040 
  (0.025) (0.033) (0.040) (0.034) 
BEND      0.060 -0.092 -0.064 -0.207 
  (0.045) (0.090) (0.107) (0.191) 
BENF 0.009 -0.091 -0.096 0.057 
  (0.015) (0.113) (0.185) (0.068) 
Other variables:     
∆Inflation   -0.001 -0.005 0.003 -0.029 
  (0.042) (0.015) (0.012) (0.044) 
∆GDP_3Y -7.108* -9.256*** -9.726*** -14.451** 
  (3.935) (2.818) (1.955) (5.783) 
Country dummies YES*** YES*** YES*** YES*** 
Time dummies YES*** YES*** YES*** YES*** 
r2         0.99 .98 .99 .99 
N 75 75 71 74 
Notes: The results are obtained using a non-linear OLS estimator with cluster-robust standard errors (clustering 
by country). Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Asterisks denote significance levels: *** - significant at 
1%, ** - significant at 5% and * - significant at 10%. Coefficients with corresponding t-statistics greater that 1 in 
absolute value, are marked bold italic.  
 
 
 43
Appendix I 
Table A1. GDP level in percentage of GDP in 1989 (pre-transition).  
country 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 
Albania 60.1 85.7 102.4 127.7 161.7 
Armenia 47.6 48.8 59.2 92.6 145.2 
Azerbaijan 67.9 37.4 51.1 71.7 160.3 
Belarus 88.1 65.5 86.5 113.6 163.4 
Bosnia & Herzegovina 35.0 32.0 61.7 73.8 92.4 
Bulgaria 77.2 72.1 76.4 93.0 118.7 
Croatia 67.3 74.0 81.9 98.1 115.6 
Czech Republic 84.6 97.1 100.5 113.6 141.0 
Estonia 67.4 67.5 88.0 117.6 145.2 
Georgia 37.0 26.6 31.8 41.3 56.7 
Hungary 82.4 88.5 106.3 125.9 138.5 
Kazakhstan 84.0 61.4 69.1 103.1 140.8 
Kyrgyzstan 83.9 59.1 72.4 87.3 104.9 
Latvia 54.6 50.3 63.0 84.5 110.0 
Lithuania 70.6 56.8 68.0 91.8 119.7 
Macedonia 79.0 71.8 82.0 84.5 101.7 
Moldova 58.1 36.8 34.5 45.2 56.8 
Montenegro 60.5 49.3 56.9 62.7 84.5 
Poland 88.1 109.6 134.3 150.8 185.6 
Romania 75.0 88.1 80.2 101.5 129.7 
Russia 78.7 58.0 65.2 82.5 107.9 
Serbia 60.5 49.3 52.0 63.2 79.2 
Slovakia 77.6 89.1 98.7 117.7 159.8 
Slovenia 82.1 95.8 114.5 131.3 160.4 
Tajikistan 65.6 38.3 46.1 67.6 89.7 
Turkmenistan 90.9 58.6 76.6 143.4 221.3 
Ukraine 77.5 40.5 40.7 57.3 69.6 
Uzbekistan 89.8 83.8 96.9 117.9 161.5 
Source: IMF (World Economic Outlook), World Bank (World Development Indicators), and EBRD. 
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Table A2. Unemployment rates in the transition countries, %. 
country 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 
Albania 26.0 12.0 16.8 14.4 12.7 
Armenia 1.8 9.3 11.7 9.6 6.3 
Azerbaijan 0.2* 0.9* 12.8 8.4 6.1 
Belarus 0.5* 4.0* 2.1* 1.9* 0.8* 
Bosnia & Herzegovina n/a n/a 16.0 22.0 23.4 
Bulgaria 15.3* 13.5 16.3 12.0 5.6 
Croatia 15.3* 10.0 16.1 13.8 8.4 
Czech Republic 2.6* 3.9 8.8 8.3 4.4 
Estonia 3.7 9.9 13.6 9.7 5.5 
Georgia 2.3* 2.4* 10.8 12.6 16.5 
Hungary 9.8 9.9 6.4 6.1 7.8 
Kazakhstan 0.4* 13.0 12.8 8.4 6.6 
Kyrgyzstan 0.1* 4.3* 13.9 8.5 11.1 
Latvia 2.3* 20.6 14.4 10.4 7.5 
Lithuania 3.5* 16.4 16.4 11.4 5.8 
Macedonia 26.3* 31.9 32.2 37.2 33.8 
Moldova 0.7* 1.5* 8.5 8.1 4.0 
Montenegro n/a 26.1** 26.5** 30.3 14.7 
Poland 13.6* 12.3 16.1 19.0 7.1 
Romania 8.2* 6.7 7.1 8.0 5.8 
Russia 5.2 9.7 9.8 7.8 6.4 
Serbia n/a 26.1** 12.1 18.5 13.6 
Slovakia 11.4* 11.3 18.6 18.1 9.5 
Slovenia 11.5* 7.3 7.2 6.1 4.4 
Tajikistan 0.4* 2.6* 9.3 7.4 2.3* 
Turkmenistan 2.4* 1.9* 4.9 2.6* 4.1* 
Ukraine 0.4* 7.6 11.6 8.6 6.4 
Uzbekistan 0.1* 0.3* 0.4* 0.4* 0.2* 
Sources: ILO, IMF, TransMonee database. Observations marked by asterisk (*) represent registered 
unemployment rate. Data for Tajikistan 2008 refer to 2007. Observations marked by double asterisk (**) are 
registered unemployment rates for Yugoslavia; data taken from UNECE Economic Survey of Europe 1998 No. 1 
and 2001 No. 2. Data for Turkmenistan 1992 refer to 1991, data for 1996 refer to 1997 and data for 2008 refer to 
2006. Data for Ukraine 1992 refer to 1993. Data for Uzbekistan 2008 refer to 2006. 
 
 
Table A3. Piecewise correlations of the variables, final estimation sample. 
 
ER UR LTUR YUR EPL DENS TAX ALMP BENF BEND ∆Inflation ∆GDP_198
9 
∆GDP_3Y 
ER X             
              
UR  -0.71*** X            
 0.00             
LTUR -0.78*** 0.97*** X           
 0.00 0.00            
YUR -0.74*** 0.81*** 0.82*** X          
 0.00 0.00 0.00           
EPL -0.32*** 0.34*** 0.35*** 0.42*** X         
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00          
DENS -0.25** 0.17 0.20* 0.24** 0.38*** X        
 0.03 0.14 0.09 0.04 0.00         
TAX 0.08 0.15 0.08 -0.09 0.00 -0.27** X       
 0.48 0.21 0.50 0.46 1.00 0.02        
ALMP 0.09 -0.09 -0.12 -0.19* -0.07 -0.18 0.33*** X      
 0.46 0.43 0.31 0.10 0.52 0.12 0.00       
BENF -0.13 0.17 0.20* 0.09 0.14 0.10 0.23* 0.22* X     
 0.28 0.14 0.09 0.45 0.24 0.40 0.05 0.06      
BEND -0.09 0.04 0.05 0.09 0.22* 0.12 0.11 0.31** 0.51*** X    
 0.45 0.72 0.66 0.45 0.05 0.30 0.36 0.01 0.00     
∆Inflation 0.00 -0.15 -0.13 -0.17 -0.23** -0.12 -0.21* 0.05 -0.07 -0.15 X   
 0.98 0.19 0.27 0.14 0.04 0.31 0.07 0.65 0.56 0.19    
GDPt-1/GDP1989 0.09 -0.24** -0.21* -0.23** -0.29** -0.55*** 0.12 0.20* -0.07 0.13 0.15 X  
 0.45 0.04 0.09 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.32 0.09 0.53 0.27 0.21   
∆GDP_3Y -0.08 -0.22* -0.14 -0.06 -0.07 -0.18 -0.45*** -0.14 -0.02 -0.14 0.33*** 0.31*** X 
 0.49 0.06 0.24 0.64 0.53 0.13 0.00 0.24 0.85 0.24 0.00 0.01  
Note: Asterisks denote significance levels: *** - significant at 1%, ** - significant at 5% and * - significant at 10%.
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 Table A4. Additional estimates with change in inflation and GDPt-1/GDP1989 as macro-controls, outliers removed. 
 Employment rate Unemployment rate Long-term unemployment rate Youth unemployment rate 
 RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE 
EPL -4.399*** -4.068** -0.243 -0.438 0.548 0.296 3.408* 2.872 
 (1.690) (1.800) (1.035) (1.130) (0.649) (0.678) (1.853) (2.090) 
ALMP 6.150* 7.361* -5.152*** -5.144** -4.310*** -4.028** -12.185*** -12.009** 
 (3.416) (3.761) (1.915) (2.329) (1.286) (1.515) (4.345) (4.957) 
TAX -0.249 -0.279 0.081 0.075 0.006 0.045 0.312 0.389 
 (0.169) (0.194) (0.121) (0.132) (0.100) (0.120) (0.250) (0.291) 
DENS -0.079 -0.075 0.024 0.032 -0.023 -0.018 0.022 0.019 
 (0.059) (0.067) (0.038) (0.042) (0.035) (0.034) (0.066) (0.067) 
BEND -0.094 -0.123 0.088 0.046 0.125** 0.090 0.274 0.083 
 (0.190) (0.214) (0.086) (0.122) (0.059) (0.053) (0.229) (0.293) 
BENF -0.023 -0.018 -0.031 -0.067 -0.001 -0.058 -0.181 -0.272 
 (0.095) (0.118) (0.072) (0.090) (0.052) (0.057) (0.156) (0.184) 
∆Inflation 0.013 0.011 -0.004 -0.005 0.001 0.000 -0.029 -0.022 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.014) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.045) (0.038) 
GDPt-1/GDP1989 1.213 1.119 -4.299 -4.714 -3.377 -4.983 -7.028 -5.865 
 (5.053) (6.023) (3.455) (4.372) (2.951) (4.066) (6.548) (7.983) 
Y2000 -4.770** -4.459** 2.758* 2.847* 1.959* 1.925* 6.097** 5.341** 
 (1.941) (2.015) (1.531) (1.568) (1.041) (1.017) (2.647) (2.567) 
Y2004 -8.229*** -7.961*** 2.414 2.479 1.884 2.133 5.350 4.336 
 (2.073) (2.234) (2.147) (2.355) (1.780) (1.968) (3.361) (3.464) 
Y2008 -8.277** -7.925** 0.145 0.481 -0.155 0.600 0.929 -0.311 
 (3.492) (3.730) (2.928) (3.348) (2.818) (3.314) (4.665) (5.083) 
Intercept 91.423*** 91.580*** 11.456* 13.006* 7.991* 9.204* 12.362 14.683 
 (6.982) (9.244) (6.662) (7.171) (4.638) (4.878) (13.349) (15.310) 
r2 0.43 .43 0.51 .51 0.48 .5 0.56 .57 
N 71 71 71 71 67 67 70 70 
Notes: The results are obtained using the random- (RE) or fixed-effects (FE) estimators with cluster-robust standard errors (clustering by country). Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. Asterisks denote significance levels: *** - significant at 1%, ** - significant at 5% and * - significant at 10%. R2 refers to the within variation in the 
data. 
 
Table A5. Results of the F-test for the strength of the instruments in the first-stage 
regressions. 
 ER UR LTUR YUR 
ALMP_TAX 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.1 
ALMP_DENS 2.5 2.5 2.3 2.2 
ALMP_BENF 0.8 0.8 1.5 1.5 
ALMP_BEND 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1 
EPL_ALMP 8.5 8.5 19.3 13.1 
EPL_TAX 13.6 13.6 16.4 10.8 
EPL_DENS 2.9 2.9 2.0 2.3 
EPL_BENF 5.3 5.3 4.3 5.4 
EPL_BEND 76.2 76.2 60.1 69.5 
TAX_DENS 2.7 2.7 3.2 3.1 
TAX_BENF 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 
TAX_BEND 28.5 28.5 17.7 17.8 
DENS_BENF 7.9 7.9 6.7 5.7 
DENS_BEND 37.0 37.0 18.1 22.0 
BENF_BEND  1.2 1.2 1.3 1.6 
Notes: Each number in the table corresponds to a separate IV regression and shows the value of the F-statistics 
from the test for the strength of the instruments. The rule of thumb is F>10 (Staiger and Stock 1997). The values 
of the test satisfying “the rule of thumb” are marked bold italic.  
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Appendix II. Details about the construction of the database.26 
 
The database of the IZA Program Area “Labor markets in emerging and transition 
economies” is a new hand-collected dataset that provides essential information about the 
evolution of labor markets in the countries of Central Europe and Central Asia. It includes 27 
countries of the region and spans 14 years, 1995-2008. The database contains how many 4 
variables characterizing labor market outcomes and 6 variables describing labor market 
institutions. There are 71 observation with complete data on these 10 variables, corresponding 
to 23 countries. The details about the variables included in the database are shown below.   
 
I. Labor market outcomes: 
• Employment to population ratio (ER): number of employed as per cent of population 
aged 15-59.27 
• Unemployment rate (UR) – number of unemployed as per cent of labor force; based 
on labor force surveys and ILO methodology.  
• Long-term unemployment rate (LTUR) – number of people which have been 
unemployed for 12 months or more as per cent of labor force 
• Youth unemployment rate (YUR) – number of people aged 15-24 years as per cent of 
labor force from this age group; based on labor force surveys. 
 
II. Labor market institutions and policies: 
• Employment protection legislation (EPL) index is based on version 2 of the OECD 
(2004) indicator and is a weighted average of 18 cardinal summary indicators of EPL 
strictness which can be gathered in three main areas: (i) employment protection of 
regular workers against individual dismissal; (ii) specific requirements for collective 
dismissals; (iii) regulation of temporary forms of employment. 
• Active labor market policies (ALMP) – expenditures on active measures of labor 
market policies and public employment services as per cent of the country’s GDP.  
• Tax wedge on labor (TAX) is defined as the difference between the salary costs of a 
single “average worker” to their employer and the amount of net income (“take-home-
                                                 
26 We would like to acknowledge advice from and contributions by Irina Denisova, Diana Digol, Raul Eamets, 
Martin Guzi, Roman Mogilevsky, Aleksei Oshchepkov, Norberto Pignatti, and Anzelika Zaiceva during our 
work on assembling the database.  
27 This age bracket has been chosen in view of the varying statutory retirement age across the countries of the 
region.  
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pay”) that the worker receives. The taxes included are personal income taxes, 
compulsory social security contributions paid by both employees and employers, as 
well as payroll taxes for the few countries that have them; no consumption taxes are 
included. 
• Union density (DENS) measures trade union density based on surveys, wherever 
possible. Where such data were not available, trade union membership and density 
were calculated using administrative data adjusted for non-active and self-employed 
members.28 
• Average unemployment benefit (BENF) – the average benefit as percentage of the 
average wage. This deviates from the estimates typically used by the OECD because 
OECD replacement rates are not very meaningful in the transition countries due to the 
caps on the size of the benefit in many countries.29  
• Maximum duration of unemployment benefits (BEND) – defined as the period for 
which a person aged 40 years who has been employed for 22 years prior to 
unemployment receives unemployment benefits, wherever possible.  
                                                 
28 A caveat concerning the quality of the union density data is due. There is a measurement problem in at least 
some of the selected countries. The World Bank notes, for instance, that “Armenia provides an example of the 
difficulty of interpreting union density figures in the CIS, with 75 percent union density by official estimates, but 
80 percent of workers claiming to “have nothing in common” with trade unions, and half of those claiming to be 
totally uninformed about unions.” For that reason the World Bank (2005) did not provide any statistics on the 
coverage rates in the CIS countries. Whenever possible we therefore examined alternative estimates of 
unionization, especially in the CIS countries.  
29 In most countries of the region, the size of the unemployment benefit is related to past earnings. The rate may 
be as high as 100% (like in Croatia at the end of the 1990s and in Ukraine in the mid-2000s). The problem is that 
there is an upper cap on the size of the benefit, which often implies, de facto, a flat rate benefit. For example, in 
the early 2000s the benefit replacement rate in Croatia was 100% of average salary in the last three months of 
employment, but the maximum was restricted to 900 Kn. Compared to the average wage of 3600 Kn, the amount 
is far less than the 100% replacement rate. Similarly, unemployed in Russia can get 75% of their average wage 
in the last three months of employment, but there is a cap of 4900 RUR (or 110 Euro) as of mid-2009. Relative 
to the average wage in the economy (17441 RUR as of 1st quarter 2009), the unemployment benefit is very low. 
The minimum benefit is almost negligible, amounting to 850 RUR only. It is essential that the minimum and 
maximum amounts of unemployment benefits are not set in a law, but are subject to government discretion.  
 
 
